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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hoping to embark on a successful entrepreneurial venture, John 
becomes Mike’s business partner wherein Mike invests in the purchase 
of two trucks for John’s use in his new trucking service. John has trouble 
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keeping up with his bills and eventually files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition. John’s attorney immediately writes Mike identifying him as a 
creditor and demanding that Mike make no attempts to collect upon the 
obligation. One month later, Mike goes to John’s residence and threatens 
to tow the trucks away. John, confused, contacts his attorney who sends 
Mike a letter indicating that his acts violated the automatic stay and 
demands that he stop such actions immediately. One month later, Mike 
enters John’s residence, shuts off the lights, and holds a finger to John’s 
head as if holding a gun and screams, “I’m not playing. Next time I’m 
going to bring a gun and blow your brains out.” For several months John 
suffers from anxiety, insomnia, and diagnosed depression as a direct 
result of Mike’s death threat.1 
While it is clear that John suffers from severe emotional distress 
attributable to Mike’s death threat, whether John may recover for his 
injuries under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“Bankruptcy Code”)2 
varies with where he files for bankruptcy.3 All federal courts rely on 11 
U.S.C. § 362(h) to determine whether and under what circumstances a 
debtor may recover emotional distress damages for a willful violation of 
the automatic stay.4 All federal decisions interpreting § 362(h) have 
decided that a debtor may recover emotional distress damages under the 
Bankruptcy Code for a willful violation of the automatic stay.5 Federal 
courts, however, are split on two main issues: (1) whether a related 
financial loss is a predicate to awarding emotional distress damages,6 and 
(2) the proof necessary for a debtor to establish a case for emotional 
distress damages.7 Of the three federal appellate courts deciding these 
                                                                                                             
 1 The preceding hypothetical is based partially on the facts in Wagner v. Ivory (In re 
Wagner), 74 B.R. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 2 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
 3 See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
emotional distress damages are not permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) where there is no 
related financial loss); But see Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that pecuniary loss is not required in order to claim emotional distress 
damages under § 362(h)). 
 4 Section 362(h) of the Code provides a statutory cause of action for a creditor’s 
willful violation of the automatic stay causing the debtor injury. 
 5 See Stinson v. Bi-Rite Rest. Supply, Inc. (In re Stinson), 295 B.R. 109 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that under appropriate circumstances emotional distress damages may 
be recovered as “actual damages” under § 362(h)); In re Rosa, 313 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2004) (holding that emotional distress is an actual injury for which a debtor may 
recover damages under § 362(h)); Bishop v. U.S. Bank (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (explaining that “actual damages” for which recovery is 
mandated under § 362(h) include those for emotional distress). 
 6 See supra note 3. 
 7 Compare Bishop, 296 B.R. at 895 (“An award of damages for emotional distress 
due to a violation of the stay is appropriate where a natural and powerful emotional 
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issues,8 only one actually specifies ways to establish a claim for 
emotional distress.9 Surprisingly, although these issues have been widely 
litigated within the circuits,10 they have received little scholarly 
attention.11 
This comment argues that: (1) financial loss should not be a 
predicate to awarding emotional distress damages for violation of the 
automatic stay, and (2) the federal appellate courts should establish clear 
guidelines for the lower courts concerning what evidence is sufficient to 
establish a claim for emotional distress damages. Part II of this comment 
analyzes the history and purpose of the automatic stay provision 
embodied in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, focusing specifically on § 
362(h), which addresses remedies for breach of the automatic stay. Part 
III compares and contrasts the three federal courts of appeals decisions 
that have addressed emotional distress damages for violation of the 
automatic stay. Part IV concludes that a financial loss should not be a 
predicate to awarding emotional distress damages for breach of the 
automatic stay, and suggests specific standards by which the lower courts 
may determine whether to award those damages in a given case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1978, eight years after Congress created the Commission on 
Bankruptcy Laws to suggest comprehensive reforms to the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act (“Bankruptcy Act”), Congress passed the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (“Bankruptcy Code” or “the Code”), replacing the 
                                                                                                             
distress is readily apparent from the nature or extent of the wrongful conduct under the 
particular circumstances surrounding the stay violation.”), with In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 
357, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Damages for mental/emotional distress may be 
awarded if two conditions are met: (1) the debtor clearly suffered some appreciable 
emotional/mental harm; and (2) the actions giving rise to the emotional/mental distress 
were severe in nature.”). 
 8 See supra note 3; see also Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 9 Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 10 See, e.g., Burke v. Georgia Dep’t of Rev. (In re Burke), 285 B.R. 534, 536-37 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001); Patterson v. Chrysler Fin. Co. (In re Patterson), 263 B.R. 82, 97 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001); Diviney v. NationsBank of Tex. (In re Diviney), 211 B.R. 951, 
961 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997), aff’d, 225 B.R. 762 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. 
Blackstone Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Fisher), 144 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992). 
 11 See Thurmond & Fleming, Do Section 362(h) “Actual Damages” Include 
Emotional Distress Damages?, Norton Bankruptcy Law Adviser No. 9 (Sept. 2004); see 
also Ralph C. McCullough II, Emotional Distress Damages: Should They Be Permitted 
Under the Bankruptcy Code for a Willful Violation of the Stay?, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 339 (Spring 2003). 
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Bankruptcy Act.12 The Bankruptcy Code was primarily enacted to 
protect the good faith debtor while also providing for the fair treatment 
of creditors.13 Since its inception in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has been 
substantially amended by Congress in 1984, 1986, 1990, and 1994.14 
The automatic stay,15 an integral part of the bankruptcy process 
introduced in 1978 providing broad protection for both debtors and 
creditors,16 becomes effective immediately upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition and prohibits most creditors from initiating or 
continuing actions against the debtor, the debtor’s property, or property 
of the estate.17 The stay’s purpose is to protect both the debtor’s and 
creditors’ interests throughout the bankruptcy proceeding.18 The House 
Report for the Bankruptcy Code explains that 
the automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections 
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing 
                                                                                                             
 12 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
 13 See CHARLES J. TABB ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICE 153 (1st ed. 2003); see also THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS ¶ 10.02[2]-[3] (rev. ed. 1991). 
 14 See The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 98-353; Pub. L. No. 99-554; 
Pub. L. No. 101-311; Pub. L. No. 103-394; see also ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., 
BANKRUPTCY 20 (5th ed. 1999). 
 15 Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that almost all collection attempts 
by creditors cease upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The stayed activities include: 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or 
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or 
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced 
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim 
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from 
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any 
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the 
debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United 
States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
 16 See TABB ET AL., supra note 13. 
 17 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1978). 
 18 See TABB ET AL., supra note 13. 
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spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to 
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be 
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into 
bankruptcy.19 
The House Report continues by underscoring the importance of 
creditor protection by explaining that 
the automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, 
certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies 
against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain 
payment of the claims in preference to20 and to the detriment of 
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly 
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated 
equally.21 A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor’s assets 
prevents that.22 
The automatic stay provision, in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
was enacted in 1978, including § 362(a) through § 362(g).23 In 1984, the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added to 
the Code subsection (h) which permits “an individual injured by any 
willful violation of a stay . . . [to] . . . recover actual damages, including 
costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances . . . punitive 
damages.”24 Prior to this amendment, debtors injured by a creditor’s 
willful breach of the automatic stay had to resort to the bankruptcy 
court’s civil contempt power under § 105(a) to redress their injury.25 
Section 362(h)’s legislative history makes clear that it was meant to 
supplement the previously existing remedies in the Bankruptcy Code.26 
                                                                                                             
 19 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-
97. 
 20 It should be noted that this is not strictly a preference as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 
547. 
 21 Technically, under the Code, all creditors are not treated equally as illustrated 
when there exists a priority creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 22 See supra note 19. 
 23 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984). 
 25 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) states: 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title 
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed 
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any 
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders 
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 
 26 See 130 CONG. REC. H1942 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Rodino) 
(“[section 362(h)] is an additional right of individual debtors, and is not intended to 
foreclose recovery under already existing remedies.”). 
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However, if bankruptcy judges could enforce the automatic stay by 
awarding the debtor damages for willful violations by creditors, what 
then is § 362(h)’s purpose? When the two sections are compared, three 
main differences are apparent: (1) the sections’ scope, (2) the nature of 
the sections, and (3) the ability to award punitive damages. 
The most apparent difference between § 362(h) and § 105(a) is in 
scope. Section 105(a), a broad equitable provision, provides bankruptcy 
courts with powers to grant relief necessary to effectuate the Code’s 
provisions, including civil contempt.27 By contrast, § 362(h) is narrowly 
tailored specifically to redress willful violations of the automatic stay 
causing injury to the debtor.28 Additionally, a majority of circuits hold 
that § 362(h) affords relief solely to individuals and not business entities 
such as corporations.29 The broader § 105(a) civil contempt remedy is 
unanimously held to apply to both individual and corporate debtors 
during the bankruptcy proceeding.30 Also, § 362(h) is self-executing 
whereas § 105(a) requires that the party asserting the cause of action 
have standing under some other section of the Bankruptcy Code.31 
Essentially, § 105(a) is a broad grant of power to effectuate the 
Bankruptcy Code while § 362(h) is a narrow provision specifically 
focusing on remedies for willful breach of the automatic stay. 
The second important distinction between § 362(h) and § 105(a) 
lies in their discretionary versus mandatory character. Civil contempt 
orders under § 105(a) are discretionary in nature so bankruptcy courts are 
                                                                                                             
 27 See Miller v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Miller), 16 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 28 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 362.11 (Matthew Bender 15th ed. rev.). 
 29 See Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 
F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporate 
debtors); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 
1152 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to impose sanctions under § 362(h) because the trustee 
was not an “individual”); Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 
1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (arguing that § 362(h) does not include corporations); Mar. 
Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186-
87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporate debtors). But see 
Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 
329 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 362(h) is applicable to corporations and partnerships); 
Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees for a violation 
of the stay relating to corporate debtors). For a more detailed analysis see WILLIAM L. 
NORTON, JR., Violation of Stay 362(h), in NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 
36:42 (1997); Peter H. Carroll, III, Statutory Construction by the Ninth Circuit in Recent 
Bankruptcy Cases, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 262, 267-68 (1995). 
 30 See, e.g., Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 
447 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that creditors that violate the stay of a corporate debtor are 
punishable under the bankruptcy court’s civil contempt power). 
 31 See, e.g., In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
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not required to award relief through contempt, even when a debtor 
qualifies for damages.32 By contrast, § 362(h) damages, with the 
exception of punitive damages, are mandatory where a creditor willfully 
violates the automatic stay.33 Section 362(h) ensures that all debtors 
injured as a result of a creditor’s willful violation of the stay receive at 
least actual damages and attorney’s fees.34 The mandatory nature of the 
award under § 362(h) increases certainty within the federal circuits and 
relieves the appellate courts of the difficult burden of reviewing an 
equitable civil contempt judgment.35 
The final difference between § 362(h) and § 105(a) is availability of 
punitive damages. Section 362(h) expressly permits an award for 
punitive damages, however, such damages are not mandatory.36 Section 
105(a) contains no express language permitting such an award and most 
bankruptcy judges are reluctant to award punitive damages under the 
court’s equitable powers.37 Section 362(h)’s express inclusion of punitive 
damages reveals a legislative desire to not only compensate debtors for 
their injuries, but also to punish creditors for willful conduct when 
justified.38 Unfortunately, confusion still exists among the circuits as to 
what conduct is necessary to justify an award of punitive damages for a 
creditor’s willful violation of a stay.39 
Distinguishing § 362(h) from § 105(a), however, still does not 
resolve the section’s ambiguities. Without an express statement in § 
362(h) of a specific legislative intent, judges have had difficulty 
                                                                                                             
 32 Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 33 Budget Serv. Co., 804 F.2d at 292 (observing that it is mandatory for courts to 
award compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for a violation of a stay under § 
362(h)). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., In re Berryhill, 127 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991); Lakefield 
Tel. Co. v. N. Telecomm., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 413, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Rototron Corp. 
v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 699-700 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 712 
F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 36 “An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section 
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 38 See, e.g., In re Sumpter, 171 B.R. 835, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 39 Compare In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that 
punitive damages are warranted under § 362(h) if the stay violation involves egregious, 
intentional misconduct on the violators part.”), with In re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 
108 B.R. 482, 487-88 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“The following factors are relevant in determining 
whether to award punitive damages and the amount of such damages: (1) the nature of 
the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s ability to pay; (3) the motives of the 
defendant; and (4) any provocation by the debtor.”). 
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interpreting under what circumstances the section authorizes an award 
for emotional distress damages.40 Section 362(h) expressly includes 
“actual damages” which usually includes compensatory damages 
whether in a contract41 or tort setting.42 Permitting emotional distress 
damages under § 362(h), requires deeming them actual damages43 as 
only actual damages and punitive damages are expressly allowed under 
the statute, and it is clear that emotional distress damages cannot be 
considered punitive damages.44 Since the legislative history of § 362(h) 
does not provide a definitive resolution to the issue of whether emotional 
distress damages are authorized under the section, the issue has largely 
been left to judicial interpretation. 
III. FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS 
Since enactment in 1984, § 362(h) has generated a significant 
amount of litigation focusing on whether emotional distress damages are 
permissible and, if so, under what circumstances.45 In the last twenty-one 
years, only three federal appellate courts have rendered opinions on the 
issue, the most recent in December of 2004.46 The opinions are divided: 
(1) one view holds that there must be a financial injury to recover 
emotional distress damages, and (2) an opposing view holds that a 
financial injury is not necessary to recover for emotional distress.47 The 
issue’s difficulty is exemplified by the most recent decision in which the 
                                                                                                             
 40 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 41 Generally, actual damages in contract law include expectancy damages, reliance 
damages, or restitutionary damages depending on the case’s facts. See CHARLES L. KNAPP 
ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 960, 1051 (4th ed. 1999). Additionally, most cases 
permit consequential and incidental damages as part of the underlying “compensatory” 
award. Id. Awards for infliction of severe emotional distress do not lie in contract claims. 
Id. at 1051. 
 42 Generally, actual damages in tort law include general compensatory damages 
(including emotional distress damages) and special compensatory damages. See 1-3 
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTION § 3.01 (Matthew Bender 2004). Additionally, in some 
circumstances punitive damages are awarded for egregious conduct. Id. 
 43 Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[Kaneb] ... held 
that damages awarded for emotional injury caused by a willful violation of the automatic 
stay are ‘actual damages’. No doubt they are; but whether their award is authorized by the 
statute is a separate question.”). 
 44 See ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES 704 (3d ed. 2002) (“Unlike 
compensatory damages, punitive damages are not awarded to plaintiffs to compensate for 
their losses. Rather, punitive damages are awarded to punish defendants for egregious 
conduct and deter defendants and others from future offenses.”). 
 45 See supra note 10. 
 46 See supra note 8. 
 47 See supra note 7. 
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Ninth Circuit withdrew its original opinion to write a new opinion with 
the exact opposite holding.48 
A. The First Circuit - Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb 
In 1993, Kenneth Kaneb (“Kaneb”), an eighty-five-year-old retiree 
and widower, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.49 Every year Kaneb spent 
the summer months at his Massachusetts residence and the winter 
months at his Florida residence.50 Kaneb sold his Massachusetts 
residence to pay secured creditors and later converted to a Chapter 7 
liquidation.51 Shawmut Bank, N.A., held the first mortgage on Kaneb’s 
second residence, a Florida condominium,52 and unsuccessfully sought 
relief from the automatic stay to initiate foreclosure proceedings, 
followed by unsuccessful settlement negotiations with Kaneb.53 Shortly 
thereafter, Shawmut Bank merged with Fleet Bank (“Fleet”) and 
subsequently forwarded Kaneb’s file to a Florida law firm (“Fleet’s 
counsel”) to initiate foreclosure proceedings.54 
The file forwarded to Fleet’s counsel contained an unsigned order 
of discharge dated January 31, 1996, and an unsigned order granting 
relief from the automatic stay.55 Fleet’s counsel believed that the 
unsigned order granted Fleet relief from the bankruptcy stay and filed a 
foreclosure complaint in state court on June 4, 1996.56 Shortly after 
beginning the foreclosure, Kaneb’s attorney informed Fleet’s counsel of 
the automatic stay and Fleet’s counsel in response placed Kaneb’s file on 
hold status.57 Six weeks later Kaneb personally wrote a letter objecting to 
the foreclosure which ultimately prompted Fleet to dismiss the 
foreclosure.58 During those six weeks, however, a foreclosure notice was 
published in the local newspaper, colorful fliers offering legal and 
investment services bombarded Kaneb’s mailbox, and Kaneb’s neighbors 
                                                                                                             
 48 Compare Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 367 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), 
withdrawn by Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 385 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2004), with 
Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 49 Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 266 (1st Circuit 1999). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 267. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. The court, in footnote 4, identifies that this belief was erroneous because the 
unsigned order did not give Fleet the requested relief from the stay. Id. at 267 n.4. 
 57 Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 267. 
 58 Id. 
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began to avoid him.59 This proved disastrous to Kaneb who lived in an 
affluent, gated community, and, prior to the foreclosure, his life had 
revolved around social and recreational activities in the condominium.60 
Kaneb commenced an action in the Massachusetts Bankruptcy 
Court demanding actual and punitive damages under § 362(h) for Fleet’s 
willful violation of the automatic stay.61 Finding a willful violation of the 
automatic stay, the bankruptcy court awarded Kaneb $25,000 in 
emotional distress damages and attorney’s fees.62 On appeal, the First 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision.63 Fleet appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
arguing insufficient evidence for the emotional distress award and that a 
plaintiff must also suffer physical harm to receive emotional distress 
damages.64 
The court began by noting that since Fleet did not raise its concern 
that physical harm must also occur to receive emotional distress 
damages, it was therefore barred from asserting it on appeal.65 Next, the 
court addressed Fleet’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the 
emotional distress claim. The court first noted that “emotional damages 
qualify as ‘actual damages’ under § 362(h),” citing two bankruptcy court 
decisions from the Second and Sixth Circuits.66 It concluded that Kaneb 
provided specific information showing a decline in social invitations and 
testified as to the resulting emotional distress, consisting of his having 
trouble sleeping, his changed eating habits, and lack of ambition to go 
out and meet new people.67 The court concluded that actual damages 
under § 362(h), “must include the psychological suffering of this eighty-
five-year-old retired widower,” and affirmed the bankruptcy appellate 
panel’s decision sustaining the award.68 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. Kaneb’s neighbors found out about the foreclosure actions through those 
residents who held Kaneb’s mail while he was not living at his Florida residence; 
additionally one neighbor received a solicitation addressed to Kaneb by mistake. Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 267 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 62 Id. at 269. 
 63 Id. at 267. 
 64 Id. Fleet also argued that there was no willful violation of the automatic stay 
despite its pretrial stipulation to the contrary, but the court declined to address this 
because Fleet had not presented the issue in the lower court proceedings. Id. 
 65 Id. at 269. The court concurred with the BAP majority in so holding. 
 66 Id. (citing Holden v. IRS (In re Holden), 226 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); In re 
Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1989)). 
 67 Id. at 270. 
 68 Id. 
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B. The Seventh Circuit - Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp. 
Laura Aiello (“Aiello”) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing 
Providian Financial Corp. (“Providian”) as a creditor for a $1,000 credit 
card debt.69 During the bankruptcy proceeding Providian demanded that 
Aiello reaffirm her debt or be subject to fraud charges.70 Aiello refused to 
reaffirm the debt and, instead, commenced a class action lawsuit in the 
bankruptcy court against Providian for its harassment, which she asserted 
constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay.71 The bankruptcy 
court granted Providian summary judgment, reasoning that, “Aiello 
could not obtain an award of damages under § 362(h) when her only 
evidence of injury was the statement in her affidavit that upon receipt of 
the threatening letter from the defendant she ‘cried, felt nauseous and 
scared and the letter caused her to quarrel with her husband.’”72 The 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, and Providian 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.73 
Judge Posner began the court’s opinion stating that the automatic 
stay is primarily financial in character, and not meant to protect the 
debtor’s peace of mind.74 Bankruptcy judges are not selected based on 
their ability to evaluate emotional distress claims, and that victims of 
emotional distress could resort to state tort law remedies to redress their 
injuries.75 Judge Posner intimated that a debtor might be able to piggy 
back a claim for emotional distress damages under the clean-up doctrine 
where the debtor also suffers a financial injury.76 Under this doctrine, the 
court may redress any financial injury caused by the willful violation of 
the automatic stay and include an award for emotional distress under the 
rubric of incidental damages, in the interest of judicial economy.77 
Applying this rule, the court held that Aiello could not recover emotional 
distress damages under § 362(h) because she did not have a financial 
injury with which to attach the claim.78 
Although Judge Posner could have ended the opinion at this point, 
he continued to discuss the evolution of emotional distress damages in 
                                                                                                             
 69 Aiello, 239 F.3d at 878. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. No evidence was offered as to the incidence of quarrels with her spouse before 
the letter’s receipt. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 879. 
 75 Id. at 879-80. 
 76 Id. at 880. See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION §  2.7, 180-81 (2d ed. 1993). 
 77 Id. at 880. Judge Posner demonstrated how this would relieve the debtor from 
having to bring two separate suits. Id. 
 78 Id. 
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the American court system.79 Since the Bankruptcy Act was passed 
“before the modern era of receptivity to claims of damages for purely 
emotional distress . . . there is no indication that Congress intended to 
change the fundamental character of remedies by enacting § 362(h).”80 
The court then noted that Aiello filed a class action lawsuit where the 
potential for abuse increases as claimants like Aiello can aggregate their 
claims with other members of the class ultimately pressuring the creditor 
into settling its claim.81 The court ended by reinforcing the idea that 
Aiello could resort to traditional state law tort remedies for her emotional 
injuries.82 
C. The Ninth Circuit – Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. 
In 1987, George and Barbara Dawson (“the Dawsons”) bought a 
home in Richmond, California, obtaining a loan from Washington 
Mutual Bank, F.A. (“Washington Mutual”) secured by a first deed of 
trust.83 The Dawsons fell into arrears in 1993, and by the end of the year 
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.84 After having their plan confirmed in late 
1993, the Dawsons again failed to make their required payments to 
Washington Mutual.85 In July of 1994, Washington Mutual obtained an 
adequate protection order from the court providing that the automatic 
stay would terminate in August of 1994 if the Dawsons did not make 
their required payments.86 The Dawsons failed to do so prompting 
Washington Mutual to schedule a foreclosure sale for early in 1995. Just 
before the date of the foreclosure sale the Dawsons tendered payment of 
the minimum required balance and the sale was discontinued.87 
In 1995, while the Dawsons made certain payments to Washington 
Mutual, they did not pay the minimum amount due under the Chapter 13 
plan.88 As a result, Washington Mutual recorded a notice of default, and 
on January 16, 1996 recorded a notice of sale stating a sale date of 
February 8, 1996.89 Two days before the scheduled sale, George Dawson 
                                                                                                             
 79 Id. at 880-81. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1143. A deed of trust is the functional equivalent of a 
mortgage in this context. Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. On May 18, 1993, the Dawsons filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and, in 
October of the same year, the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.90 While the facts are disputed as to whether 
or when Washington Mutual received notice of the Chapter 7 filing, the 
bankruptcy court held that Washington Mutual knew of the proceeding 
by February 20, 1996, at the latest.91 On February 27, 1996, Washington 
Mutual commenced an unlawful detainer action against the Dawsons 
and, on the same day, received notice of George Dawson’s Chapter 7 
filing.92 Washington Mutual later dismissed the unlawful detainer action 
and, on July 23 of that same year, George Dawson’s Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case was closed.93 On June 2, 1998, the Dawsons filed for a 
second Chapter 13 bankruptcy and initiated an adversary complaint for 
emotional distress damages stemming from Washington Mutual’s 
violation of the automatic stay during George Dawson’s prior Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding.94 
The bankruptcy court found a willful violation of the automatic stay 
between February 20 and March 14, 1996,95 but denied the Dawsons 
claim for emotional distress damages finding: (1) that the violation was 
not egregious, and (2) the Dawsons failed to present sufficient evidence 
to establish an award for emotional distress damages.96 Ultimately, the 
bankruptcy court awarded Washington Mutual attorney’s fees and costs 
in the amount of $2,307.60.97 The district court affirmed all holdings 
relevant to the damage claim but remanded on another issue.98 The 
Dawsons appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.99 
The court began by determining whether Congress intended the 
term “actual damages” in § 362(h) to include damages for emotional 
distress.100 The statute included no definition for the term actual 
damages,101 however, the court noted the importance of Congress’s use 
of the term “individual” to denote whom may recover actual damages.102 
                                                                                                             
 90 Id. at 1144. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. The court reasoned that Washington Mutual knew about George Dawson’s 
Chapter 7 filing on February 20, 1996, at the latest; however Washington Mutual did not 
dismiss its unlawful detainer action until March 14, 1996. Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. The district court remanded the case as it found that it was possible that 
Washington Mutual violated the automatic stay with its February 1996 foreclosure sale, 
because the Dawsons may have had an equitable interest in the property at the time 
(through the Jameson Agreement). Id. 
 99 Id. at 1145. 
 100 Id. at 1146. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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Since the term “individual” applies to humans and not artificial entities, 
such as corporations, the court concluded that Congress expressed an 
intent to redress harms unique to human beings, such as emotional 
distress.103 
Since the statute’s text did not fully resolve the ambiguity, the court 
turned to the legislative history of § 362.104 Congress enacted the section 
with two goals intended for debtors: (1) a purely financial one meant to 
give the debtor time to get his finances in order and to reorganize his 
debts to maximize debt satisfaction,105 and (2) a more human goal 
intended to give the debtor a “breathing spell” from his creditors.106 The 
court referred to specific comments from the House Report: 
The stay is the first part of bankruptcy relief, for it gives the 
debtor a respite from the forces that led him to bankruptcy. 
Frequently, a consumer debtor is severely harassed by his 
creditors when he falls behind in payments on loans. The 
harassment takes the form of abusive phone calls at all hours, 
including at work, threats of court action, attacks on the debtor’s 
reputation, and so on. The automatic stay at the commencement 
of the case takes the pressure off the debtor.107 
The court concluded that Congress intended emotional distress 
damages to be recoverable under the section.108 
Having concluded that emotional distress damages are authorized 
under § 362(h), the court next focused on formulating a proper standard 
to apply to claims for emotional distress damages.109 The court rejected 
the Seventh Circuit’s argument that a financial loss is necessary for a 
debtor to recover emotional distress damages under the section.110 The 
court then determined that a debtor could recover for emotional distress 
only if he or she: (1) suffers significant harm,111 (2) clearly establishes 
the significant harm, and (3) demonstrates a causal connection between 
the significant harm and the violation of the automatic stay.112 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1146-47. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. (citing U.S. v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 107 Id. at 1147-48 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125-26, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086-87). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 1148-49. 
 110 Id. at 1149. 
 111 Id. The court identified that fleeting or trivial anxiety or distress does not suffice 
for a claim of emotional distress under § 362(h). Id. 
 112 Id. The court notes that for the third prong (the causal connection) the harm must 
be distinct from the anxiety and pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process. Id. 
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After establishing the proper standard for emotional distress claims, 
the court turned to how a debtor could clearly establish a significant 
harm. The court identified four general ways a debtor could do so: (1) 
through corroborating medical evidence,113 (2) through the testimony of 
non-experts, such as family, as to the manifestations of the emotional 
distress the debtor exhibited,114 (3) a creditor may exhibit egregious 
conduct and the significant harm may be readily apparent,115 and (4) the 
significant harm may be readily apparent even though there is no 
accompanying egregious conduct by the creditor.116 
Next, the court applied the standard to the Dawson’s claim, noting 
that the bankruptcy court did not permit an award for emotional distress 
damages, and that the court of appeals was reviewing that decision to 
ensure that the finding was not clearly erroneous.117 The only evidence 
presented on behalf of George Dawson’s claim for emotional distress 
damages was a self-declaration of emotional distress.118 The court of 
appeals agreed with the bankruptcy court’s holding that Washington 
Mutual’s conduct was not egregious, but was instead brief and minor; 
however, it disagreed with the holding that, because the creditor’s 
misconduct was not egregious, corroborating evidence was required to 
establish the emotional distress.119 Rather, the court held that 
an individual can prove entitlement to emotional distress 
damages even in the absence of corroborating evidence and even 
                                                                                                             
 113 Id. (citing In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463 (requiring specific and definite evidence to 
establish an emotional distress claim arising from violation of the automatic stay); In re 
Stinson, 295 B.R. at 120 (“The majority of the courts have denied damages for emotional 
distress where there is no medical or other hard evidence to show something more than a 
fleeting or inconsequential injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Diviney, 
211 B.R. at 967 (holding that where emotional distress seemed trivial and no medical 
evidence corroborated the claim, damages for emotional distress were not warranted)). 
 114 Id. at 1149-50 (citing Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 821-22 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that testimony from the debtor’s wife - that 
he suffered from headaches, did not feel well for a week, and went to the doctor to have 
his nerves checked - was sufficient to support emotional distress damages of $1,000 
without medical testimony)). 
 115 Id. at 1150 (citing In re Wagner, 74 B.R. at 905 (awarding emotional distress 
damages, based on the debtor’s testimony, when a creditor entered the debtor’s home at 
night, doused the lights, and pretended to hold a gun to the debtor’s head)). 
 116 Id. (citing United States v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 185 B.R. 89, 93 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1995) (affirming $5,000 award of emotional distress damages, with no mention of 
corroborating testimony, because “it is clear that appellee suffered emotional harm” when 
she was forced to cancel her son’s birthday party because her checking account had been 
frozen, even though the stay violation was brief and not egregious)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. While Barbara Dawson submitted a declaration detailing the emotional distress 
she allegedly endured, she provided no information as to George’s emotional distress. Id. 
 119 Id. at 1150-51. 
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in the absence of an egregious violation, if the individual in fact 
suffered significant emotional harm and the circumstances 
surrounding the violation make it obvious that a reasonable 
person would suffer significant emotional harm.120 
The case was remanded for reconsideration.121 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The three courts of appeals decisions illustrate the circuit split 
concerning emotional distress damages under § 362(h). The 
disagreements among the circuits are: (1) whether a financial injury 
attributable to a violation of the automatic stay is necessary to recover 
emotional distress damages, and (2) what the proper legal standard is for 
an emotional distress claim. 
A. No Financial Loss Should Be Necessary 
Before an appropriate legal standard can be developed, the courts 
must first determine whether a debtor claiming emotional distress must 
also claim a related financial injury in order to qualify for emotional 
distress damages. Aiello held that a debtor must first suffer a financial 
loss attributable to the violation of the automatic stay before recovering 
damages for related emotional distress,122 by contrast Dawson allowed 
the debtor to recover emotional distress damages without a related 
financial injury.123 There being only two conflicting rulings by the 
circuits, no majority rule has emerged. 
The most comprehensive way to analyze whether § 362(h) requires 
a financial loss before a debtor can recover for emotional distress is a 
tripartite approach: (1) scrutinize the statute’s actual text to determine if 
there is a plain meaning, (2) review the legislative history to see if 
Congress contemplated the issue when it enacted the section, and (3) 
review bankruptcy court decisions to assist in adding flesh to the 
statutory framework. Ultimately, the appropriate conclusion emerges that 
requiring a financial loss is inconsistent with the text of the statute, the 
legislative history of the section, and the weight of authority in the 
bankruptcy courts. 
                                                                                                             
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1151. 
 122 Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880. 
 123 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149. The only other court of appeals to decide the issue of 
emotional distress damages for a violation of the automatic stay is the First Circuit, which 
did not address the issue presented here, but rather only held that emotional distress 
damages are considered “actual damages” under the section. Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 269. 
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1. The Text of Section 362(h) 
Section 362(h) is short and seemingly straight forward stating that, 
“an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this 
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”124 
The text is devoid of any suggestion that financial injury is a prerequisite 
to recovering emotional distress damages. The text does not say “an 
individual injured financially,” rather it states, “an individual injured” 
without further elaboration.125 A recent Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Court 
decision illustrates that the conclusion in Aiello is improper as it “add[s] 
‘actual damages’ to the requirements of a ‘willful violation’ and an 
‘injury’, a requirement that . . . [is] extra-statutory and unauthorized.”126 
Additionally, use of the term “actual damages” may evidence Congress’s 
intent to give debtors substantial latitude in recovering damages for 
willful violation of the stay.127 The text seems to suggest that so long as a 
willful violation of the automatic stay causes an injury to the debtor, the 
debtor may recover damages for such injury under § 362(h). 
The Seventh Circuit in Aiello did not appropriately analyze the 
section’s text, instead deferring to the Code as a whole for a solution.128 
The Ninth Circuit in Dawson, however, did analyze the text and 
appropriately determined that it weighed in favor of not including a 
requirement of related financial loss.129 The Ninth Circuit honed in on 
Congress’s use of “individual” to denote the type of debtor eligible to 
recover.130 The court assumed Congress’s purpose in using the term 
“individual” was to redress harms that were unique to humans, such as 
emotional distress claims.131 While this assumption may be criticized, the 
use of “individual” may be the largest textual clue as to what types of 
harms Congress intended to redress under the section. It is not 
dispositive, however, because the federal circuits are not unanimous in 
                                                                                                             
 124 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984). 
 125 Id. See In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (“Regarding the 
necessity of an ‘injury,’ the Court notes that an ‘injury’ is broadly defined as being ‘a 
violation of another’s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy.’ BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999). The automatic stay is a legal right afforded to debtors 
that, in part, protects them from continued collection actions by their creditors . . . Thus, 
the mere violation of the automatic stay constitutes an injury to the debtor inasmuch as 
the creditor’s violation restricts the debtor’s breathing spell and subjects the debtor to 
continued collection efforts, possibly including harassment and intimidation.”). 
 126 In re Jackson, 309 B.R. at 37-38. 
 127 In re Stinson, 295 B.R. at 121. 
 128 Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880-81. 
 129 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1146. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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holding that a corporation is deemed not to be an individual under this 
section of the Bankruptcy Code.132 
Congress added to the court’s power the ability to award punitive 
damages under § 362(h), not previously available under the court’s civil 
contempt power,133 possibly reflecting a congressional desire to protect 
the debtor’s financial and emotional prosperity by punishing creditors 
who impinge on either through egregious violation of the stay. If 
Congress only intended to protect the debtor’s financial interests, actual 
damages under the section would adequately compensate the debtor for 
his loss. Congress, however, added the remedy of punitive damages to 
penalize a creditor’s egregious violation of the stay. Most egregious 
violations of the stay are likely to have the ability to inflict emotional 
distress on the debtor,134 and Congress may have added punitive damages 
as an additional protection of the debtor’s emotional state. After reading 
the statute as a whole, there is no definitive plain meaning as to whether 
a financial loss is necessary to award emotional distress damages, but the 
text tends to favor an interpretation not requiring a financial loss. 
2. Legislative History of Section 362(h) 
Scattered throughout the House Reports on the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 are specific references to the automatic stay and glimpses 
into what Congress intended to rectify through application of the 
automatic stay. The House Report begins by stating: 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor 
protections provided by the Bankruptcy Laws. It gives the 
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. 
It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
reorganizational plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial 
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.135 
This exemplifies Congress’s intent to redress pressures on the 
debtor that were both financial and emotional in nature, as the first 
purpose the House Report identifies for the stay is to give the debtor a 
                                                                                                             
 132 See supra note 29. The Ninth Circuit is quick to make this assumption because 
circuit precedent holds that the term “individual” refers only to individuals and not to 
corporations. See, e.g., Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 
618-20 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 133 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Part IV.B.2 infra. 
 135 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-
97 (emphasis added). 
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“breathing spell” from his creditors.136 This might mean a financial 
breathing spell, but the next sentence qualifies it, saying that the stay 
stops “all collection efforts” and “all harassment.”137 The House Report 
would not have included “all harassment” if it intended to protect only 
the debtor’s financial interest. 
The House Report discusses the importance of the automatic stay 
specifically in Chapter 7 liquidations recognizing that: 
The stay is the first part of the bankruptcy relief, for it gives 
the debtor a respite from the forces that led him to bankruptcy. 
Frequently, a consumer debtor is severely harassed by his 
creditors when he falls behind in payments on loans. The 
harassment takes the form of abusive phone calls at all hours, 
including at work, threats of court action, attacks on the 
debtor’s reputation, and so on. The automatic stay at the 
commencement of the case takes the pressure off of the 
debtor. Once the debtor has commenced the case, all creditors’ 
rights against the debtor become rights against the estate. 
Creditors must seek satisfaction of their claims from the 
estate. The automatic stay recognizes this by preventing 
creditors from pursuing the debtor.138 
While this paragraph addresses Chapter 7 cases, its application to 
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is evident. The stay gives the 
debtor a respite from the forces that led to bankruptcy, which could refer 
to the financial forces, the emotional forces, or both.139 The next two 
sentences, however, detail how this respite means a respite from both the 
financial and emotional pressures of creditors. Congress expressly 
illustrates the types of harassment a typical debtor encounters, and how 
the automatic stay was designed to prevent such harassment.140 
At one point in the House Report, Congress expressly references 
the section’s purpose of protecting both the debtor’s social and economic 
problems.141 The House Report states: 
The consumer who seeks the relief of a bankruptcy court is an 
individual who is in desperate trouble. He lacks the resources 
to meet his commitments and has no means at his disposal to 
rectify this situation. The short term future that he faces can 
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 137 Id. 
 138 H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 125-26 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6086-87 (emphasis added). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 173 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6134. 
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literally destroy the basic integrity of his household. We 
believe that this individual is entitled to a focused and 
compassionate effort on the part of the legal system to 
alleviate otherwise insurmountable social and economic 
problems.142 
Thus, Congress enacted § 362 to preserve the debtor’s estate, while 
additionally assisting with the debtor’s “otherwise insurmountable social 
problems.”143 This express purpose of alleviating the debtor’s social 
problems, undeniably evident in this excerpt, weighs against an 
interpretation that this section is only concerned with the debtor’s 
finances. 
The legislative history reveals a congressional intent to protect 
debtors from both financial loss and unreasonable emotional distress. 
Multiple passages from the House Report indicate a desire to protect the 
debtor from creditor harassment and insurmountable social problems.144 
At most points, where the debtor’s financial interest is raised, the 
debtor’s social and emotional state is also contemplated. While the 
automatic stay is meant primarily to protect financial interests, an evident 
second purpose is to protect the debtor’s reasonable emotional 
expectations. The legislative history points strongly to an interpretation 
permitting an award for emotional distress without a related financial 
injury. 
3. Relevant Bankruptcy Court Decisions 
Since § 362(h)’s enactment in 1984, the issue of emotional distress 
damages has been extensively litigated in bankruptcy courts.145 
Analyzing these decisions will reveal the general sentiment of 
bankruptcy judges when it comes to awarding emotional distress 
damages under this section. The analysis begins by looking to 
bankruptcy opinions which have awarded emotional distress damages 
and, then, contrasting those with others denying such damages. 
Bankruptcy court cases awarding emotional distress damages can 
be broken down into two categories: (1) those awarding damages without 
a related financial injury; and (2) those awarding damages involving a 
related financial injury. The latter category is not as helpful since all 
courts hold that emotional distress damages are available where there is 
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 144 See supra notes 135 and 142. 
 145 See supra note 10. 
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also a related financial injury.146 The cases in the former category 
provide important insight into why a related financial loss is not 
necessary. The following analysis focuses on these cases which illustrate 
under what circumstances bankruptcy courts are willing to award 
emotional distress damages without a related financial loss. 
Bankruptcy courts have not hesitated to award emotional distress 
damages to a debtor where a creditor refers its debt to collection agencies 
post-petition, who then issue harassing letters and harassing telephone 
calls to the debtor.147 Additionally, courts have awarded emotional 
distress damages to a debtor where the creditor goes to the debtor’s home 
and vituperatively demands the payment of an outstanding debt.148 
Likewise, bankruptcy courts have awarded the debtor emotional distress 
damages when a creditor sends repossession agents, post-petition, to the 
debtor’s residence to collect upon an outstanding debt.149 All of these 
scenarios share a common trait: there is no accompanying financial loss 
associated with the willful violation of the stay. In some of these cases, 
courts even ignored the actual injury suffered by the debtor, yet awarded 
emotional distress damages anyway based on the egregiousness of the 
creditor’s conduct.150 These examples illustrate how bankruptcy courts 
focus more on the acts of the creditor and its effect on the debtor, as 
opposed to whether a financial injury accompanied the emotional injury, 
when determining the applicability of emotional distress claims. 
The bankruptcy court cases denying emotional distress damages 
can also be broken down into two categories: (1) denial because of lack 
of evidence to support the claim; and (2) denial because of a lack of an 
                                                                                                             
 146 However, some cases which have permitted an emotional distress claim where 
there was also a financial injury have expressly stated as dicta that a financial injury is 
not required to recover such damages under § 362(h). See, e.g., In re Bishop, 296 B.R. at 
897 (“emotional distress is an actual harm that qualifies for an award of actual damages 
under § 362(h) without regard to the existence of other damages.”). 
 147 See, e.g., Faust v. Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc. (In re Faust), 270 B.R. 310, 317 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998) (awarding debtor emotional distress damages even though the 
debtor did not sustain any financial injury and only claimed that she was worried and 
upset for a few days afterward); In re Jacobs, 100 B.R. 357, 360 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) 
(awarding debtor emotional distress damages for embarrassment and humiliation 
stemming from the creditor’s obnoxious collection efforts although the debtor never 
sustained any financial injury resulting from the violation). 
 148 In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. at 171-72 (holding that the creditor’s action would have 
caused any debtor anxiety and, thus, awarded debtor emotional distress damages without 
any related financial injury). 
 149 Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. Minn. 1985) 
(awarding the debtor emotional distress damages for the humiliation, embarrassment, 
anxiety and frustration she suffered in the incident even though there was no 
accompanying financial injury (besides the cost of replacing the broken door)). 
 150 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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accompanying financial injury. The cases in the latter category would be 
extremely beneficial in determining the underlying logic of the Seventh 
Circuit’s proposition that a financial injury is required.151 Unfortunately, 
only one bankruptcy court outside of the Seventh Circuit has held that a 
financial injury is required before a debtor may receive emotional 
distress damages, and its analysis is not extensive.152 Additionally, those 
bankruptcy decisions in the Seventh Circuit denying emotional distress 
claims for lack of accompanying financial injury merely defer to Aiello 
as controlling authority in lieu of providing logical support for such a 
holding.153 The plethora of cases in the former category exhibits the 
dysfunctional nature of the circuits in their inability to decide a proper 
standard for proving emotional distress claims. Those cases will be 
analyzed in more detail in the following section discussing the 
appropriate standards for determining a claim for emotional distress.154 
A review of bankruptcy court decisions throughout the various 
circuits reveals that bankruptcy judges favor an interpretation permitting 
emotional distress damages for violation of the automatic stay without 
accompanying financial injury. Cases denying emotional distress 
damages have mainly done so due to a lack of evidence presented by the 
debtor155 or because of a lack of uniform standards from which to 
determine if a claim for emotional distress resides.156 Only one case 
outside the Seventh Circuit has held that a financial injury is necessary to 
recover under the section, and that case has now been superseded by the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dawson.157 
Considering the statute’s text which does not include the 
requirement of a related financial injury, the legislative history which 
expressly identifies the need to protect the debtor’s reasonable emotional 
                                                                                                             
 151 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 152 In re Stinson, 295 B.R. at 119-20 (agreeing with Aiello because of the opportunity 
for abuse, however, this opinion was rendered before Dawson and as such would no 
longer be controlling law in the Ninth Circuit). 
 153 See, e.g., In re Harris, 310 B.R. 395, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) (“The damages 
contemplated by § 362(h) are primarily those relating to ‘financial loss.’ [citing 
Aiello].”); In re Welch, 296 B.R. 170, 172 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (“Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit does not permit recovery for purely emotional injuries under 11 U.S.C. § 
362(h). [citing Aiello].”). 
 154 See infra Part IV.B. 
 155 See In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463 (holding that evidence is insufficient where the 
only evidence submitted by the debtor consisted of the debtor’s own vague and 
conclusory testimony on the issue); see also In re Diviney, 211 B.R. at 967-68 (denying 
claim where debtor offered no evidence to prove any such damages); In re Putnam, 167 
B.R. 737 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (holding that insufficient evidence existed for an award 
for humiliation). 
 156 See supra note 7. 
 157 See supra note 152. 
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expectations, and the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy court 
opinions which hold that a financial injury is not a predicate to awarding 
emotional distress damages, it seems evident that the proper conclusion 
is to award emotional distress damages regardless of accompanying 
financial injury. Additionally, practical considerations, such as judicial 
economy, militate against requiring that the debtor suffer a financial 
injury in order to recover in the bankruptcy court for his injury.158 
B. The Proper Legal Standard 
If a financial injury should not be a predicate to emotional distress 
damages under § 362(h), what should the proper legal standard be for a 
claim for emotional distress? Many bankruptcy and state courts have 
struggled with devising a bright line rule for emotional distress cases.159 
As the bankruptcy court in Aiello noted, emotional distress damages 
under § 362(h), “have been determined on a case-by-case basis, with no 
expressly articulated principle guiding the decisions.”160 To achieve 
uniform treatment of all debtors, in all circuits, the federal courts of 
appeals must adopt clear guidelines on how to establish a claim for 
emotional distress. 
Dawson recently made the first attempt at composing a clear 
standard.161 While the overall standard is well drafted, the details of each 
element still need to be revised. Dawson held that a debtor claiming 
emotional distress damages must: (1) suffer significant harm, (2) clearly 
establish the significant harm, and (3) demonstrate a causal connection 
between that significant harm and the violation of the automatic stay.162 
Upon initial review, this provides an umbrella framework satisfactory to 
guide bankruptcy courts in deciding whether to award emotional distress 
damages for willful violation of the stay. When each element is 
examined more closely, however, it appears that the standard needs to be 
modified to broaden some requirements while narrowing others. 
1. Debtor Must Suffer Significant Harm 
The court’s first requirement is succinct but ambiguous, stating that 
a debtor must suffer significant harm to recover for emotional distress 
                                                                                                             
 158 See, e.g., Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880 (Judge Posner intimated that judicial economy 
would encourage that the debtor be spared from having to bring a separate lawsuit, apart 
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bankruptcy proceeding). 
 159 See supra note 10. 
 160 Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 161 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50. 
 162 Id. at 1149. 
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damages under § 362(h).163 The court does not elaborate as to what 
significant harm is, simply stating that, “fleeting or trivial anxiety or 
distress does not count.”164 The court cites In re Skeen deciding that the 
debtor was not entitled to emotional distress damages because she did 
not suffer significant harm.165 The debtor was “torn-up, shaken, and 
nervous the rest of the day as a result of the telephone calls, [however] 
there was no evidence that she sought medical relief or that the anxiety 
caused by [creditor’s] collection efforts rendered her incapable of going 
about her daily routine.”166 If this holding were followed, debtors would 
not be able to fulfill the Ninth Circuit’s first requirement unless they 
sought medical relief or the distress rendered them incapable of going 
about a daily routine. It does not seem appropriate for the standard to be 
based on factors that do not directly relate to the debtor’s severity of 
harm. For example, consider a debtor who suffers from insomnia due to a 
creditor’s egregious violation of the automatic stay, but does not seek 
medical treatment and continues to go to work. Is this debtor to be denied 
recovery even upon proof of the damages and a causal connection? 
A requirement that the harm inflicted must be “significant” is 
important because it addresses concerns that awarding damages for 
emotional distress opens the door to frivolous claims.167 It is a threshold 
requirement, however, that should not take into consideration issues of 
proof but should only address whether the severity of the injury alleged 
is compensable if adequately proved. Unfortunately, most courts blend 
the first and second requirements together which has resulted in poor 
precedent as to what constitutes fleeting and inconsequential injury and 
what constitutes a significant injury.168 
The standard of “fleeting and inconsequential” should not depend 
on whether the debtor is seeking medical treatment.169 This is not to say 
that this should not be one factor a court may consider when determining 
if the harm is substantial, however, it should not be the main or sole 
factor in its analysis. Bankruptcy courts should focus on factors such as: 
(1) whether there is a physical manifestation of the emotional distress, 
(2) what effect the distress would have on a reasonable person’s daily 
                                                                                                             
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. (citing In re Skeen, 248 B.R. 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000)). 
 166 In re Skeen, 248 B.R. at 318-19. 
 167 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149. 
 168 See, e.g., In re Meis-Nachtrab, 190 B.R. 302, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); 
Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 
1998) (“claims with respect to emotional distress damages require proof of evidence of 
the nature and extent of emotional harm caused by the alleged violation.”). 
 169 See, e.g., In re Crispell, 73 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987). 
2005] NO FINANCIAL INJURY NO PROBLEM 193 
life, (3) what effect the distress had on this particular debtor’s daily life, 
(4) if the debtor sought medical treatment (either consulting with a 
doctor or psychologist), or (5) displays of other objective manifestations 
of harm.170 To ensure that the harm is significant, courts should require 
that there be a physical manifestation of the emotional distress. Absent 
physical manifestation of the emotional distress, the debtor must allege 
that the emotional distress had a severe effect on his daily activities. 
Such a standard will require judges to analyze the facts of 
emotional distress claims on a case-by-case basis. While it is not a bright 
line rule judges can apply across the board, it provides guidance for 
courts which may increase consistency and efficiency. Additionally, it 
will keep the first requirement’s analysis of alleging significant harm 
distinct from the second requirement’s analysis of proving that harm. 
This distinction is important because a court must first determine if the 
debtor has a compensable claim before it may determine if the debtor can 
adequately prove that claim. 
2. Debtor Must Adequately Prove the Harm 
The second, and most comprehensive, element the Ninth Circuit 
establishes in Dawson is that the debtor must clearly establish the 
significant harm alleged in the first element.171 This focuses on issues of 
proof, and more specifically, what a debtor must do to convince the court 
that a claim of emotional distress is true. Bankruptcy courts, as well as 
all federal and state courts, have had difficulty establishing clear 
guidelines for how to prove emotional distress damages.172 Emotional 
distress damages, by their very nature, are difficult to prove since they 
may not be observable to the naked eye. The intangible nature of an 
emotional distress claim makes this second requirement so important, as 
it is one of the final hurdles standing in the way of frivolous claims. 
Dawson expanded upon the concept of clearly establishing the 
debtor’s significant harm. The court addressed four general ways a 
debtor could adequately prove his emotional distress damages: (1) by 
offering corroborating medical evidence, (2) through testimony by non-
experts as to the debtor’s manifestations of mental anguish, (3) where 
there is egregious conduct and the harm is readily apparent, or (4) where 
there is no egregious conduct but the circumstances make it obvious that 
a reasonable person would suffer significant emotional harm.173 This list, 
however is not exclusive because the court expressly stated that “an 
                                                                                                             
 170 See, e.g., In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004). 
 171 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149. 
 172 See supra note 7. 
 173 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50. 
194 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:169 
individual may establish” a claim for emotional distress through one of 
these alternatives.174 
A proper analysis requires an examination of each alternative 
addressed by the court. The first way for a debtor to prove emotional 
distress damages is through corroborating medical evidence.175 This 
obviously is the most reliable way to prove emotional distress damages 
because it is difficult to ignore clear scientific evidence supporting some 
sort of manifestation from the emotional distress. Many debtors lack 
corroborating medical evidence either because no medical treatment was 
sought by the debtor or because the injury did not lend itself to being 
corroborated by medical evidence. This has presented a problem for 
debtors because circuits which require corroborating medical evidence to 
prove emotional distress damages preclude claims by debtors who either 
do not have physical manifestations of their emotional distress or do not 
consult with a doctor or psychologist about their injury.176 Overcoming 
this hurdle will require bankruptcy courts to allow debtors alternative 
ways in which to prove their injury.177 
A debtor can prove emotional distress damages under Dawson 
through testimony by non-experts as to the debtor’s manifestations of 
mental anguish.178 Dawson made express references to both friends and 
coworkers as non-experts who could testify that significant emotional 
harm had occurred.179 This alternative, however, is not as reliable as 
corroborating medical evidence and does not yet have clearly defined 
parameters. 
This alternative is fraught with the possibility of fraud as the “non-
experts” may also be interested parties. The case the court cited for 
purposes of illustrating this alternative provides the perfect example of 
the possibility for fraud. The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
permitted emotional distress damages where: 
The Debtor’s wife testified that the Debtor was ‘hysterical’ and had 
a headache upon returning home from the incident with [the creditor]. 
Four or five days later, he still did not feel well and went to a doctor who 
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recommended medication for his nerves. She was unable to remember 
either the name of the doctor or the name of the pills that were 
prescribed.180 
This passage illustrates how this alternative does not provide proper 
guidelines for ensuring that the debtor is truly suffering from severe 
emotional distress. When the “non-expert” is also an interested party, 
testimony alone with nothing more should not serve as the basis for 
proving a claim for emotional distress. Courts are most concerned about 
limiting frivolous claims for emotional distress.181 Permitting a single 
“non-expert”, who may be an interested witness, to prove the debtor’s 
emotional distress through testimony, bankruptcy courts open the 
floodgates for allowing frivolous claims for emotional distress. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s second alternative for proving the debtor’s 
emotional distress should not be followed. 
This second alternative, however, may be modified to ensure 
reliable results while also permitting debtors to prove their emotional 
distress damages without medical corroboration. If multiple objective 
“non-experts” can testify to the debtor’s manifestation of the emotional 
distress, then this alternative should prove reliable. Multiple “non-
expert” testimonies will limit frivolous claims by ensuring that a single 
interested party cannot establish the requisite proof for a claim of 
emotional distress. More importantly, permitting a debtor to prove 
emotional distress damages in this manner relieves the debtor from the 
confining obligation to present medical corroboration of the injury. 
The third way to prove emotional distress damages is when the 
creditor’s egregious conduct makes it readily apparent that the debtor 
suffered emotional distress.182 Although, at first glance, this seems to fall 
short of a proper standard, ultimately it should provide reliable outcomes 
for proving emotional distress damages. Egregious conduct, often 
likened to outrageous conduct in the tort realm, is conduct that “goes 
beyond all possible bounds of decency to be regarded as atrocious and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”183 Situations in which a 
creditor engages in egregious conduct will likely result in emotional 
distress to any debtor strictly by definition of what conduct is deemed to 
be egregious. While this standard does not require any corroborating 
evidence, there is no need for it if the conduct itself is expected to cause 
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emotional distress to most individuals.184 Therefore, this alternative can 
safely be adopted by future courts in determining if the debtor has proven 
his emotional distress damages. 
Bankruptcy courts must be cautious, however, not to provide in 
actual damages what should be provided through punitive damages.185 
Just because it is sufficient for the egregiousness of the act to provide the 
basis for proving that the emotional distress existed, it should not also 
skew the award given which should be based purely on the damages 
sustained by the debtor. 
Lastly, a debtor can prove emotional distress damages under 
Dawson where there is no egregious creditor conduct, but the 
circumstances make clear that a reasonable person would suffer 
significant emotional harm.186 This permits courts to award emotional 
distress damages absent egregious conduct, corroborating medical 
evidence, or expert testimony. This type of provision instills fear in 
judges, like Judge Posner, who feel that awarding emotional distress 
damages opens the floodgates to frivolous claims.187 Relying only on the 
debtor’s own testimony, the court has no tangible proof for an award of 
emotional distress damages.188 
The amorphous nature of this category becomes more evident when 
reviewing the case relied upon to support the holding. That case is In re 
Flynn, where the debtor was “forced to cancel her son’s birthday party, 
embarrassed in a check-out line at the supermarket and justifiably 
worried that her checks would bounce due to the freeze on her 
account.”189 This emotional distress may not pass muster under the first 
requirement discussed earlier,190 and it is not obvious that a reasonable 
person would experience severe emotional distress under similar 
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circumstances. Such an unimaginable standard is susceptible to 
inconsistent application. Other bankruptcy courts have held that the 
debtor’s testimony without more cannot serve as a rational basis for 
awarding emotional distress damages.191 This provides sufficient 
justification to reject this final alternative. 
Ultimately, only two ways out of the four enunciated in Dawson 
provide a satisfactory basis for a debtor to prove emotional distress 
damages: (1) proof through corroborating medical evidence,192 and (2) 
proof of the creditor’s egregious conduct making it readily apparent that 
the debtor suffered emotional distress.193 Additionally, a modification of 
the second alternative provided in Dawson should permit a debtor to 
prove emotional distress damages through multiple objective “non-
expert” testimonies. While it may be restrictive to permit only three ways 
to prove emotional distress damages, it is important to properly regulate 
such claims due to the enhanced susceptibility to fraud.194 Without such a 
narrow construction, it would be impossible to permit emotional distress 
damages at all for fear of frivolous claims. 
3. Debtor Must Demonstrate a Causal Connection 
The final hurdle debtors must clear to establish a claim for 
emotional distress damages is demonstrating a causal connection 
between the significant harm inflicted and a violation of the automatic 
stay.195 As Dawson noted, the statute itself requires that the debtor be 
“injured by” the violation.196 This distinguishes those harms inherent in 
the bankruptcy process from those resulting from a willful violation of 
the automatic stay. Bankruptcy is a harrowing experience that would 
cause any debtor stress and anxiety. Debtors should not be permitted to 
collect damages from a creditor if suffering anxiety from the bankruptcy 
process itself, as opposed to inappropriate creditor conduct. 
                                                                                                             
 191 See, e.g., In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463 (holding that where the only evidence 
presented was the debtor’s own vague and conclusory testimony, such proof with nothing 
more is insufficient to prove a claim for emotional distress); In re Diviney, 211 B.R. at 
967-68 (holding that emotional distress damages were not sufficiently proved where “the 
only evidence of any emotional distress is found in testimony that conversations between 
the Bank and the Debtors became heated at times, and that profanity was used in at least 
one of those conversations.”). 
 192 Corroborating medical evidence may take the form of a doctor’s diagnosis, 
prescribed medicine, or a physical manifestation of the distress. 
 193 An example of such an incident would be where a creditor breaks into a home and 
pretends to hold a gun up to the debtor’s head. See In re Wagner, 74 B.R. at 900-01. 
 194 See supra note 187. 
 195 Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150. 
 196 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)). 
198 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:169 
In re Brockington perfectly illustrates a debtor’s lack of proper 
causation.197 During a Chapter 13 proceeding, a secured creditor in the 
debtor’s automobile towed the car from the debtor’s residence.198 For 
several weeks thereafter, debtor went to the hospital for treatment of a 
pre-existing heart condition.199 Debtor claimed emotional distress 
damages stemming from the creditor’s willful violation of the automatic 
stay, asserting the cost of medical treatment as the proper measure of 
damages.200 The court found no proof of a causal connection between the 
repossession and any ensuing medical treatment for an aggravated heart 
condition.201 Brockington illustrates how the causation requirement 
prevents debtors from recovering damages from creditors absent proper 
causation. 
The causation requirement implies that a debtor must make 
reasonable efforts to mitigate those damages where possible. A good 
example is In re Jackson, where a creditor repeatedly placed 
repossession notices in the debtor’s door and made harassing telephone 
calls to the debtor.202 The court noted that, “[w]hile these actions were 
undoubtedly annoying and embarrassing . . . [debtor] could have ended 
the harassment early on by asking her attorney to speak with [the 
creditor] about its continued collection efforts.”203 Had the debtor 
informed her attorney as to the harassing phone calls and repossession 
notices, the harassment would probably have ceased upon the attorney’s 
advising the creditor that its actions violated the automatic stay. Debtors 
are to be barred from recovering emotional distress damages when those 
injuries could have easily been avoided. 
Since a claim for emotional distress damages is inherently a tort 
claim, causation is particularly important in ensuring that the tortfeasor is 
actually the one culpable for the damage incurred by the debtor.204 
Without a causation requirement, creditors violating the automatic stay 
will be liable to the debtor for any cognizable harm which the debtor 
experienced during the often lengthy bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy 
courts must be careful not to overlook this element of a claim of 
emotional distress under § 362(h), which may readily occur because the 
first two requirements provide the substantive basis for the debtor’s 
claim. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The automatic stay is one of the most fundamental protections 
provided for debtors and creditors in the Bankruptcy Code. Congress’s 
enactment of § 362(h) in 1984 was a large step toward providing more 
comprehensive consumer protection under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Encapsulated in that consumer protection is protection from harassment 
or egregious conduct by creditors which willfully violates the automatic 
stay. Although the Bankruptcy Code is primarily concerned with 
preserving the debtor’s finances, it is also concerned with redressing the 
debtor’s emotional injuries resulting from the violation of the stay. 
A comprehensive look at § 362(h) reveals that the text of the 
section, the legislative history of the section and a hefty majority of the 
bankruptcy courts urge an interpretation permitting emotional distress 
damages regardless of a financial loss. The text does not include an 
express requirement of a financial loss by the debtor and the legislative 
history makes several references to protecting the debtor’s social welfare 
and protecting against unlawful creditor harassment. Additionally, only 
one bankruptcy court outside of the Seventh Circuit has held that a 
pecuniary loss is a requirement to redressing a debtor’s claim for 
emotional distress. It is clear that the proper interpretation of § 362(h) is 
to permit emotional distress damages regardless of whether the debtor 
suffered an accompanying financial injury. 
A debtor has three hurdles to clear before collecting an award for 
emotional distress. First the debtor’s claim must be significant, which 
should require the debtor to display some form of physical manifestation 
of the distress. If the debtor’s distress does not physically manifest itself, 
the burden should then shift to the debtor to prove that the distress had a 
severe effect on his daily life. The debtor must next prove the significant 
harm, which can be established through either corroborating medical 
evidence, multiple objective “non-expert” testimonies, or if the creditor’s 
egregious conduct makes it readily apparent that the debtor suffered 
emotional distress. Finally, the debtor must prove a causal connection 
between the injury claimed and the creditor’s willful violation of the 
automatic stay. 
The Ninth Circuit in Dawson laid a solid foundation from which 
other federal courts of appeals can now expound upon. This comment 
argues that certain of those requirements should be broadened, while 
other requirements should be constricted. For bankruptcy courts to have 
a clear directive as to when to permit such damages, other courts of 
appeals must hear the issue and weigh in on the debate. Until then, or 
until Congress speaks to the issue, the framework provided in Dawson 
and variations thereof must be utilized to enhance uniformity within the 
circuits. 
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